Moldova is once again preparing to implement emergency management measures as a preventive measure—that is, before a physical shortage of energy resources arises. On September 21, following a meeting of the National Security Council, President Maia Sandu announced the need for a state of emergency in the energy and hydrological sectors. The following day, the government submitted a proposal to Parliament to declare a state of emergency nationwide for 60 days, effective September 26.
At the same time, more than 90% of the gas needed for the cold season has already been contracted; the authorities currently see no immediate risk of a shortage, and the situation with petroleum products has improved significantly. So why is ordinary legislation once again insufficient to manage these risks?
There are grounds for concern. This winter, the country will have to import about 59% of the electricity it needs. During peak hours, the demand for imports is estimated at 400–450 MW, while the guaranteed capacity is about 360 MW. Herewith, there remains a serious hydrological deficit on the Dniester and Prut rivers, which could complicate water supply and reduce hydropower generation capacity.
In the gas market, the risk is currently financial rather than physical. On September 21, the TTF price stood at 77.31 euros per MWh—more than double the 2025 average price of around 36 euros. European storage facilities are about 69% full, compared to a five-year average of about 85%, and winter futures are hovering around 76–77 euros per MWh. For Moldova, this means expensive purchases and the need to finance mandatory reserves. The country's strategic reserve—56.3 million cubic meters—is equivalent to about ten days of winter consumption. However, the Ministry of Energy emphasizes that it is intended to address supply disruptions, not to keep prices in check.
The situation with petroleum products, on the other hand, has improved. In early August, reserves were sufficient for about 3.5 days, and 109 gas stations (about one-fifth) reported shortages of certain types of fuel. Currently, reserves last for about ten days, and such shortages are reported at no more than six gas stations. That is why the government describes the proposed state of emergency as preventive.
915 Days of a State of Emergency
A state of emergency in Moldova can hardly be considered a rare measure anymore. Since March 2020, the country has gone through several distinct periods of a state of emergency: the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021 gas crisis, the energy crisis of early 2022, the war in Ukraine and related threats, the energy crisis of 2024–2025, and a new crisis in the spring of 2026.
A parliamentary ex-post assessment of emergency legislation shows that by February 13, 2025, the total duration of nationwide states of emergency had reached 915 days: approximately two and a half years out of just under five years.
After that, the mechanism was used again. In December 2024, an energy state of emergency was declared for 60 days due to the threat of gas supplies to the Transnistrian region being cut off. In the spring of 2026, the reason was even more specific: on March 23, following strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, the Vulcanesti–Isaccea power line went offline, and during peak hours, there was a risk of a 350–400 MW shortfall. On March 25, parliament declared a state of emergency for 60 days.
However, as early as April 25, the government lifted it ahead of schedule, stating that the infrastructure had been restored, the petroleum products market was stabilizing, and maintaining the state of emergency any longer was no longer proportionate. Instead, a state of heightened alert was introduced. Now the authorities are proposing to revert to the previous status.
Why is a state of heightened alert insufficient?
A state of heightened alert also provides the government with significant tools for intervention: the authorities can require daily data on inventories and import plans for petroleum products, and if inventories fall below certain thresholds, they can restrict the export and re-export of gasoline and diesel fuel.
But the current draft reveals the limitations of this regime. The government believes that, in the event the situation worsens, it needs tools that are not available without a state of emergency. Furthermore, the current heightened readiness regime in the energy and hydrology sectors ends on September 25, reaching the 60-day maximum duration established by law.
What a State of Emergency Provides
According to the draft parliamentary resolution, the National Commission for Crisis Management (CNMC) will be granted key operational powers for 60 days. It will be able to adopt mandatory, temporary, and proportionate measures that deviate from existing regulations or temporarily suspend certain provisions thereof. These decisions will be binding on government agencies, companies, institutions, and citizens.
The powers are broad: the commission will be able to intervene in the procurement, storage, distribution, and use of energy resources and fuel; regulate imports, exports, transportation, and trade; introduce temporary measures regarding prices, tariffs, taxes, and excise duties; set priorities for electricity supply and consumption restrictions; limit non-essential industrial and agricultural water withdrawals; and mobilize state resources.
The draft's explanatory memorandum explicitly states that the heightened readiness regime has reached its functional limits. Without a state of emergency, the authorities cannot promptly impose direct restrictions on trade and exports, mandatory scheduling of power distribution and rolling blackouts, rationing of industrial consumption, tax exemptions to mitigate price shocks, and the direct mobilization of material resources.
A state of emergency, however, does not imply unchecked power. As early as 2020, the Constitutional Court noted that expanding the executive branch's powers creates the risk of a de facto imbalance between the branches of government and requires effective parliamentary oversight. Emergency measures must be necessary to achieve the stated objectives, remain within the scope of the executive branch's authority, and be subject to oversight.
The current draft stipulates that regulatory decisions of general application must be justified, published immediately, and submitted to parliament within a maximum of 72 hours. But the mere fact of submitting them to lawmakers does not yet imply substantive oversight, and it is unclear how parliament will evaluate the exercise of these powers within 60 days.
When the Exception Becomes the Rule
The current draft explains the need for a state of emergency more specifically than the general formula about the need to "respond quickly." But at the same time, a significant portion of the risks are already structural in nature rather than emergency-related. Moldova has long been dependent on imports of electricity and petroleum products, purchases gas on the international market, and droughts and reduced flows in the Dniester and Prut rivers may recur. Indeed, the government itself speaks of the chronic nature of these risks.
If a sudden disruption occurs—such as the outage of the Vulcănești–Isaccea power line in the spring of 2026—the emergency mechanism allows for a rapid response to an event that could not have been fully anticipated. The current state of emergency is different: it is being declared before the main risks materialize, even though a significant portion of them are known and quantified in advance.
So why are emergency powers needed again to manage recurring and largely predictable threats? If export restrictions, consumption quotas, tax exemptions, and other special instruments regularly prove necessary for energy security, shouldn't at least some of them be given a permanent and more precisely regulated legal framework?
After 915 days of a nationwide state of emergency by February 2025 and the new emergency measures that followed, the situation has already gone far beyond the scope of a single winter. If the risks become permanent and largely predictable, then a state of emergency gradually ceases to be merely a tool for unforeseen crises. So why does the state still need emergency powers in areas where the normal system of governance should have its own functioning mechanisms? // 23.09.2026 – InfoMarket.