The National Bank of Moldova (NBM), which has significantly tightened its sanctions policy in recent years with regard to banks, non-bank credit organization, insurance companies, and fintech firms, may scale back its role in the final stage of a financial institution's operations—after its license is revoked. The Ministry of Finance's draft provides for transferring the liquidation of insolvent banks to court supervision, and creditors will be given the opportunity to oversee the sale of assets and the work of the liquidator.
This is not about weakening the NBM, but rather about dividing responsibilities. The regulator will retain the exclusive right to determine whether grounds for liquidation exist, to revoke a license, and to file a petition with the court. The court will formally declare the institution insolvent and initiate liquidation proceedings. In doing so, it must rely on the NBM's assessments and not override the regulator's position, except in cases where an obvious error is identified.
Currently, the model is entirely administrative. The NBM decides on compulsory liquidation, appoints a liquidator, oversees the liquidator's work, and manages the process until the bank is removed from the state register. As a result, a single body is responsible for both oversight prior to license revocation and the disposal of remaining assets after the bank's closure.
In the explanatory note, this structure is identified as a source of conflicts of interest and reputational risks for the NBM. Liquidation involves distributing losses among shareholders and creditors, selling assets, and establishing the order of priority for payments. Such decisions can be challenged, and the regulator is effectively responsible for both the bank's condition prior to its collapse and the consequences of its closure.
The new model separates these functions. A court will initiate the proceedings, appoint a liquidator upon the NBM's recommendation, and oversee the legality of the liquidator's actions. Not only individuals but also legal entities that meet the requirements established by the regulator may serve as liquidators.
Creditors' rights will be expanded. Their meeting will approve the liquidation plan, as well as transactions involving the sale of the bank as a single asset pool or the partial transfer of its assets and liabilities. The creditors' committee consisting of an odd number of members, up to seven, will review quarterly reports and the implementation of the plan, as well as set the liquidator's fixed compensation and success fee. The Deposit Guarantee Fund will have a mandatory seat on the committee. The NBM and the Ministry of Finance will join the committee with voting rights if they are creditors of the institution being liquidated.
However, the new system will not be entirely independent of the NBM. The regulator proposes the candidate for liquidator, sets the requirements for the position, and assesses conflicts of interest. Only the NBM will be able to request that the court remove the liquidator. Members of the creditors' committee will also be appointed by the court upon the recommendation of the NBM. Oversight will be judicial and collective, but the regulator retains significant influence over the composition of the participants in the proceedings.
The draft continues the transformation of the NBM, as previously described in an InfoMarket commentary on the shift from soft supervision to a stricter sanctions regime. The regulator is focusing on inspections, early intervention, and the imposition of sanctions up to and including license revocation, while transferring the management of assets from a bank that has already been closed to the court and creditors.
However, the reform does not establish an independent pre-trial mechanism for reviewing fines and other supervisory decisions, the need for which had been raised by financial market participants. Judicial oversight within the liquidation procedure itself begins only after the NBM has established grounds for closing the institution and revoked its license.
The most controversial change is the elimination of a time limit for liquidation. Currently, the procedure must be completed within five years, although this period may be extended repeatedly for up to two years at a time. The draft completely removes the time limit, proposing instead to incentivize the liquidator with a fee contingent on the plan's fulfillment.
The authors of the document believe that a predetermined timeframe is not always realistic, especially if the assets are tied up in protracted litigation or due to the insolvency of debtors. However, without a time limit, liquidation could drag on indefinitely. Financial incentives will accelerate the process only if there are clear performance metrics, transparent evaluation of results, and accountability for failure to meet the plan.
The reform will not affect Banca de Economii, Banca Socială, and Unibank, which have been in liquidation since October 16, 2015. They will continue to operate under the old law and under the supervision of the NBM. As previously reported, as of June 30, 2026, BEM, Banca Socială, and Unibank had repaid a total of 2 billion 950.78 million lei out of the 14.1 billion lei in term loans previously received from the National Bank, and this amount remained unchanged compared to the figures as of March 31, 2026.
The new system will not provide a solution for the most problematic bank liquidations of the past. Its effectiveness can only be assessed once the next troubled institution is closed. The main criteria will be the speed of asset sales, the amount of funds returned to creditors, the transparency of the liquidator's appointment, and the court's ability to oversee the proceedings, in which the NBM will continue to exert key influence. // 04.08.2026 — InfoMarket.